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LEVERAGING SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERTISE IN 
IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING 
Ming H. Chen 
ABSTRACT— The longstanding uncertainty about how policymakers 
should grapple with social science demonstrating racism persists in the 
modern administrative state. This Essay examines the uses and misuses of 
social science and expertise in immigration policymaking. More 
specifically, it highlights three immigration policies that dismiss social 
scientific findings and expertise as part of presidential and agency decision-
making: border control, crime control, and extreme vetting of refugees to 
prevent terrorism. The Essay claims that these rejections of expertise 
undermine both substantive and procedural protections for immigrants and 
undermine important functions of the administrative state as a curb on 
irrationality in policymaking. It concludes by suggesting administrative, 
political, and judicial mechanisms that would encourage policymakers to 
leverage expertise and curb irrationality in immigration policymaking. 
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In the Northwestern University Law Review’s 2017 Symposium: “A 
Fear of Too Much Justice?: Equal Protection and the Social Sciences 30 
Years After McCleskey v. Kemp,” social scientists and experts demonstrate 
racial disparities in criminal justice, marriage equality, civil rights, and 
many other areas of social life. Yet courts routinely overlook this evidence, 
instead pushing policy based on erroneous assumptions. The same is true in 
the administrative state. If anything, McCleskey’s legacy has gained 
momentum in a Trump Administration that mistrusts intellectualism and 
endorses policies without a sound evidentiary basis. 
The rejection of expertise is particularly problematic when it comes to 
recent immigration policy. If correcting racial bias has been elusive under 
the Equal Protection Clause and civil rights statutes, it has been even more 
elusive where immigrants are concerned. The most significant immigration 
policy changes have been announced by the President and his political 
advisors. The administrative agencies implementing these decisions accord 
significant weight to political considerations. They adopt their policies 
swiftly and with minimal justification or factual foundation. Courts 
evaluating agency decisions traditionally defer to these agencies and to 
Congress, precisely because they are steeped in political judgments. 
Given that immigration policies involve hotly-contested values and 
high-stakes consequences for immigrants, from an institutional standpoint, 
immigration policy should involve more expertise and less politics. 
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Adopting evidence-based policy requires opening up immigration 
policymaking to internal and external voices that operate on the basis of 
reliable, expert information. It also requires a measure of independence to 
counter excesses in political decision-making. These voices might be 
administrative agencies internal to the executive branch. They might come 
from political channels including Congress, citizen advisory groups, or 
interest groups. Or they might be judicial avenues of reviewing agency 
reasoning and records. 
This Essay examines the deficient use of social science and expertise 
in the modern administrative state. More specifically, it highlights key 
immigration policies that dismiss social scientific findings and expertise as 
part of presidential and agency decision-making. This dismissal 
undermines both substantive and procedural protections for immigrants. 
Part I presents background on the key principles and structures that have 
led agencies to reject considerations of social science and expertise in 
policymaking. It then explains how this rejection has been even more 
pronounced in immigration law and policymaking. Part II presents 
examples of three signature immigration policies that dismiss relevant 
social science expertise: border control, crime control, and extreme vetting 
of refugees to prevent terrorism.  Part III shows how applying traditional 
administrative law principles to the immigration context would encourage 
agencies to better leverage expertise in immigration policy. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERTISE 
Administrative agencies have wrestled with the incorporation of 
expertise in their policymaking since their inception. This Part provides a 
brief look at this history, exploring how agencies first embraced social 
science evidence through the use of experts and procedures that promote 
reasoned decision-making. It then describes why these agency officials and 
procedures are missing in the realm of immigration policymaking. 
A. Rise and Decline of Social Science Expertise in Administrative Law 
The push and pull between expertise and democratic accountability 
animated agency decision-making during the New Deal and civil rights era. 
These eras saw the expansion of the administrative state built on the need 
for expertise in policymaking. Administrative law scholar James O. 
Freedman says that the origins of the administrative state reveal the 
“commitment to expertise as a principal justification for the administrative 
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process.”1 He cites one of the founding figures in administrative law, James 
Landis, as saying of agencies in the New Deal era: 
[With] the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant; for the 
art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its operation, 
ability to shift requirements as the conditions of the industry may dictate, the 
pursuit of energetic measures upon the appearance of an emergency, and the 
power through enforcement to realize conclusions as to policy.2 
The judicial opinions reviewing administrative power during this time of 
expanding federal power similarly recognized that modern life had become 
too complex for the President or Congress to regulate without assistance.3 
William O. Douglas said, “Administrative government . . . is democracy’s 
way of dealing with the overcomplicated social and economic problems of 
today.”4 
An enduring concern for democratic accountability accompanied the 
expansion of expertise in agencies. The edifice of modern administrative 
law offered two main safeguards to prevent arbitrary decision-making and 
to mitigate the absence of direct electoral accountability, both of which 
remain relevant to immigration policymaking today: experts and 
administrative procedure. 
B. Civil Servants and Other Neutral Experts 
Chief among these safeguards was the creation of a professionalized 
civil service that would serve as neutral experts within a political system.5 
The rise of neutral experts during this time period promised both a 
substantive and structural check on politics. 
 
 1 James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 364–65 
(1976). 
 2 Id. at 364 (citing JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23–24 (1938)). 
 3 Foundational administrative law cases on nondelegation to agencies include Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 4 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 246 (James Allen ed., 1940); see also 
William O. Douglas, Foreword, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1959). Jerome Frank, another important 
intellectual figure of the New Deal, held views similar to those of Douglas. See JEROME FRANK, IF MEN 
WERE ANGELS: SOME ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT IN A DEMOCRACY 19–20 (1942). 
 5 Landis wrote that expertise “springs only from that continuity of interest, that ability and desire to 
devote fifty-two weeks a year, year after year, to a particular problem.” LANDIS, supra note 2, at 23. 
Felix Frankfurter shared Landis’s faith in disinterested expertise as a mechanism of social regulation 
and desire for “a highly trained and disinterested permanent service, charged with the task of 
administering the broad policies formulated by [the government].” FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC 
AND ITS GOVERNMENT 145 (1930). 
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Substantively, the civil servant class was expected to accumulate 
experience in the increasingly complex matters of policy and provide 
increased capacity to implement policies enacted by the President and 
Congress.6 While not always social scientists by training, they offered 
learned expertise. Structurally, career civil servants provided an internal 
separation of powers that functioned as a check on political leadership 
within agencies and a counterbalance against presidential interference.7 
Civil servants blunted the force of political goals due to their fidelity to 
statutes, organizational missions, and professional duties.8 They drew upon 
learned expertise in administrative and policy substance and had access to a 
wider array of expert information and research as they conducted their jobs, 
especially if they fully engaged norms of consultation and deliberation 
while fashioning policy. They tended to serve for long periods of time 
across multiple administrations, giving them the long view and tempering 
the fluctuations of volatile changes. As the next Section details, they also 
commissioned reports from external experts. 
C. Advisory Councils, Academics, and Researchers as  
Independent Experts 
A second type of expert came from outside the government. 
Policymakers in Congress and agencies supplemented the learned expertise 
of their career staff with expertise from a cadre of independent researchers. 
Lawmakers sought out these experts for staff advisory councils or 
conferred with agency experts on an informal basis while those experts 
 
 6 See LANDIS, supra note 2, at 10–17; JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 187–208 
(2012) (describing expert agency overseeing steamboat safety). 
 7 See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal 
Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 417–18 (2007) (quoting Frankfurter and Landis’s views 
that expertise would counter demagoguery). For modern scholarship on the internal separation of 
powers, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and 
Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 
(2016). Modern scholarship on presidential control, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) and Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 
124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015), amplifies these issues. 
 8 See generally SHANNON GLEESON, CONFLICTING COMMITMENTS: THE POLITICS OF ENFORCING 
IMMIGRANT WORKER RIGHTS IN SAN JOSE AND HOUSTON (2012) (describing bureaucratic 
implementation of immigrant worker policies in states with contrasting political cultures); MARISSA 
MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS?: POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE 
REAGAN YEARS (2000) (describing career civil servant responses to conservatism of the Reagan 
administration); Ming H. Chen, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Bureaucratic Politics in 
Federal Workplace Agencies Serving Undocumented Workers, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 227, 
243 (2012) (describing implementation of immigrants’ rights in federal workplace agencies). 
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maintained their positions in universities and nonprofit organizations. 
Councils of advisors offered a useful alternative to the singular voice 
within an agency that reported to a single political figure. They were able 
to provide peer review of specific findings and offer an array of views 
when the social science did not lead inevitably to a single policy solution.9 
Ranging from scientists to economists to statisticians, these experts offered 
their professional norms around information gathering and rigorous 
research in order to shape policymaking. While their findings in 
controversial policy areas were not without their own biases, they furnished 
a foundation for forging policy based on norms from their profession rather 
than norms from politics. 
D. Procedures to Facilitate Reasoned Decision-Making in Agencies 
In addition to the search for neutral experts, Congress and courts 
turned to administrative procedure to reinforce principles of reasoned 
decision-making and to avoid arbitrary and capricious decision-making. In 
Beyond Accountability, Professor Lisa Bressman threads the concern for 
avoiding arbitrariness and abuse of discretion through several stages of 
U.S. history:10 first, early thought of administrative agencies as a “mere 
transmission belt” for legislative action;11 then, the rise of 1930s New Deal 
agencies engaged in social reform and economic regulation;12 and finally, 
1960s public-interest-minded agencies striving to advance a veritable rights 
revolution by curbing abuses of discretion.13 In A Place for Agency 
Expertise, Professor Wendy Wagner extends this history by recounting the 
rise and the fall of agencies.14 Professor Wagner illuminates the growing 
distrust of the “geek squad” or agency-as-expert model: during the social 
 
9 See generally Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise 
with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019 (2015) (professionalized civil service typified by 
internal staff or external peer review of technical findings); Freedman, supra note 1. 
10 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469–85 (2003); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated 
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 
73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 90 n.34 (1994). See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical 
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986) (surveying regulatory politics and the Supreme Court 
throughout American history). 
 11 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 
1675 (1975). 
 12 See generally MASHAW, supra note 6, at 187–208 (describing expert agency overseeing 
steamboat safety); Schiller, supra note 7. 
 13 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE (1993) (detailing emerging commitment of the national government to 
environment, consumer safety, anti-discrimination, and other rights subsequently placed under 
challenge). 
 14 See Wagner, supra note 9, at 2025–26. 
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regulation of the 1960–70s, some regulated groups began to worry about 
agency capture and politicized purpose.15 Courts reviewing agency 
decisions responded by requiring agencies to identify their assumptions, 
methods, and evidence, as well as explain their reasoning. These concerns 
also led to the rise of decision-making procedures that promote 
transparency and enable public oversight.16 
These procedural safeguards have solidified in the modern era. Rather 
than sorting out the bounds of substantive expertise or ruling on specific 
findings, the twenty-first century model of the agency-as-expert relies on a 
highly proceduralized approach to decision-making. Some of the 
requirements are contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
passed by Congress in 1946, and subsequent transsubstantive legislation 
intended to heighten political accountability. Many organic statutes include 
requirements as to what an agency must, can, or cannot consider in making 
its decisions. For example, the Endangered Species Act specifies that no 
agency can take any action with a potential effect on an endangered species 
without first consulting the Secretary of the Interior to render a biological 
opinion that the action does not threaten an endangered species.17 The 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires federal agencies to 
conduct environmental impact analyses that can be weighed against 
economic motivations and technological feasibility when making decisions 
that could affect the quality of the human and natural environment.18 
Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses 
of significant regulatory actions and submit them to the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs.19 The APA and some of these other 
legislative requirements are not binding on the head of the administrative 
state, the President. However, past presidents have been more open to the 
inclusion of science and other data in policymaking than President Trump.20 
 
 15 Wagner cites especially scientific decisions from health/risk-management and environment 
giving rise to these attacks, at least some of the time from regulated entities with opposing interests. Id. 
 16 See generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial 
Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733 (2011) (discussing these issues in 
science policy context). 
 17 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)–(b) (2012). 
 18 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012); see also Environmental 
Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (2018) (detailing the environment impact analysis procedure if a 
proposed major federal action is determined to significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment). 
 19 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 20 See Scientific Integrity: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
74 Fed. Reg. 10671 (Mar. 11, 2009) (President Obama’s memorandum stating “[t]o the extent permitted 
by law, there should be transparency in the preparation, identification, and use of scientific and 
technological information in policymaking”). Other reinforcing executive directives came from the 
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E. Consideration of Reason and Expertise in the Immigration Agencies 
While the prototypical instances of agencies considering expertise 
arise in technical policy arenas such as the environment or economy,21 
important examples arise in civil rights, immigration policy, and elsewhere. 
This Essay focuses on immigration policymakers who routinely reject 
expertise in their policymaking. 
In the modern immigration bureaucracy, expertise resides in the career 
civil servants who work alongside political appointees in the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Department of Justice  
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). There is traditionally a 
bent toward promoting career staff into leadership positions within the 
agencies, but there is also a regular infusion of political appointees at the 
top of the agency. Recognizing the political sensitivity of immigration, the 
post-9/11 structure of the immigration bureaucracy separates enforcement 
functions from policymaking functions by professionalizing the role of 
immigration judges and by concentrating them in the immigration courts, 
rather than the more politicized Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE).22 Learned expertise is supplemented by substantive expertise in areas 
related to immigration policy such as the Office of Immigration Statistics. 
But in spite of these efforts, immigration agencies still remain more 
susceptible to political pressures and less able to cultivate expertise than 
those in other policy areas. 
The Trump Administration has violated the traditional division of 
enforcement functions by initiating policies in the White House without 
consulting cabinet leaders in DHS or the State Department, by squelching 
dissent within agencies, and by conflating the organizational missions of 
the DHS, DOJ, and State Department in its rush to push change. Consider 
the initially weak influence of then-DHS Secretary John Kelly on the travel 
ban and the overly strong influence of Attorney General Jeff Sessions on 
areas of immigration policy typically administered by the DHS.23 The 
 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the form of peer-review, cost-benefit, and risk-
assessment guidelines. Compare this statement with President Trump questioning agency experts, 
dismissing fake news, and offering “alternative facts” in lieu of political propaganda in his 
policymaking. See Lochlan Morrissey, Alternative Facts Do Exist: Beliefs, Lies, and Politics, 57 
GRIFFITH REVIEW (2017) reprinted in THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 4, 2017), 
http://theconversation.com/alternative-facts-do-exist-beliefs-lies-and-politics-84692 
[https://perma.cc/CV8M-W5N8]. 
 21 For examples of agency scientific expertise, see generally Sharon B. Jacobs, Energy Deference, 
40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 49 (2016); Thomas O. MacGarity, Judicial Review of Scientific 
Rulemaking, 9 SCI., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 97 (1984); and Meazell, supra note 16. 
 22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(l) (2018). 
23 See, e.g., James Pfiffner, Why John Kelly Can’t Tame the White House Chaos, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/18/trump-says-
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ability of civil servants to resist these high-level political changes has been 
compromised by the firing of interim Attorney General Sally Yates for 
opposing the travel ban,24 the intimidation of State Department officials,25 
and threats to the independence of immigration judges and line officers 
through altered hiring standards and performance metrics.26 
As far as procedure, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
differs from legislation targeted at other administrative bodies in that it 
does not require immigration agencies to conduct impact analyses or 
consult with experts in policymaking.27 To the extent that immigration 
agencies voluntarily consider expert advice, they are not bound to follow 
the findings.28 Agency heads can promulgate policies without developing 
any factual record. The factual record that immigration judges’ decisions 
rest upon in immigration adjudication can be quite limited, even in cases 
where the facts rather than legal issues are crucial to the resolution of the 
case. In asylum cases, for example, establishing the credibility of an 
asylum-seeker’s professed fear of persecution through expert testimony or 
reports on the safety of country conditions for return is exceedingly 
difficult due to precarious circumstances. Additionally, the Board of 
 
theres-no-white-house-chaos-heres-why-john-kelly-will-have-trouble-making-that-
so/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5f24b8a4f4bc [https://perma.cc/D4ZU-HVAK] (recounting that then-
Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly complained his department had not been consulted 
regarding President Trump’s executive order banning Muslim immigrants and stating that it had not 
gone through a regular policy process). 
 24 See Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires Acting Attorney General Who Defied Him, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-immigration-ban-memo.html 
[https://perma.cc/7QXC-FRZ9]. 
 25 See Ryan Lizza, White House to State Department Dissenters: Quit, NEW YORKER (Jan. 31, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ryan-lizza/white-house-to-state-department-dissenters-quit 
[https://perma.cc/UM4V-8WA9]. 
 26 See Elliot Spagat, Justice Department Imposes Quotas on Immigration Judges, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://apnews.com/3b1f1f09171141b5b99dece73afbf202 
[https://perma.cc/7NZP-PEZ6]. 
 27 Indeed, earlier immigration laws limiting admissions from certain countries were based on 
dubious facts about immigrants based on eugenics. See, e.g., Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-
139, 43 Stat. 153 (May 26, 1924) (containing provisions prohibiting dysgenic Italians and Eastern 
European Jews). This example raises the important question of how to separate reliable social science 
from more dubious or politically-motivated claims, which should be examined more fully in future 
research. 
 28 The requirements for reliance on Federal Advisory Committee Act findings are scant and mostly 
limit the influence of the Committee. See, e.g., Federal Advisory Committee Act § 5(b)(3), 5 U.S.C. 
app. 2 § 5(b)(3) (2012) (requiring appropriate provisions to assure that the advice and recommendations 
of the Advisory Committee will not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or special 
interest). Consequently, THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS INTO AMERICAN SOCIETY, NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. Preface vii-viii (Mary C. Waters & Marisa Gerstein Pineau eds., 2015) [hereinafter NAS Report], 
notes the aim of the report is “to facilitate a more informed and fact-based discussion” of immigrant 
integration based on commissioned research and panel discussions with experts. 
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Immigration Appeals (BIA) and reviewing courts are constrained in their 
ability to second-guess the record.29 Yet “[n]o mechanism exists . . . to 
assure fundamental fairness in how country conditions information is 
utilized in the decision-making process.”30 Consequently, a lot of 
immigration law and asylum is based on common sense impressions of 
migrant behavior, rather than on social science or expertise.31 
Compounding the weakening of structural provisions that allow for 
expertise to influence policymaking, immigration policy rests on loose 
procedures. This is largely due to the traditionally deferential posture of 
courts to the President in matters impacting national sovereignty, the 
exceptional status for law enforcement and national security policymaking, 
and the fact that immigration agencies are exempt from many of the 
procedural requirements that apply in other contexts, such as compliance 
with the APA. 
While more factors are certainly at play in immigration policymaking, 
this brief history illuminates structural features, such as the resistance to 
experts and the deficiency of procedure, that contribute to problematic 
tendencies of modern immigration policy to dismiss expertise. 
II. REJECTION OF EXPERTISE IN IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING 
The history of immigration policy shows a persistent rejection of 
expertise, across parties and across time. Government officials have 
ignored, misused, and even lied about social science expertise. They have 
also rejected civil servant expertise in favor of political leadership in the 
White House or agencies with political objectives. Part II discusses several 
notable departures from expertise in the signature immigration policies of 
recent presidential administrations. It focuses especially on rejections of 
social science evidence in border control, crime control, and treatment of 
refugees. 
A. Border Control and Policies of Self-Deportation 
Federal immigration policy in both parties has made false assumptions 
about the factors driving unauthorized migration, as evidenced by the 
Obama and Trump Administrations. The Obama Administration’s 
categorization of recent arrivals as high priorities for removal assumed that 
strong enforcement would deter continued unauthorized crossings, 
 
 29 Susan K. Kerns, Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asylum Cases: Leveling the 
Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 198 n.6 (2000) (noting the deferential 
standard of review to BIA findings in case law and by statute). 
 30 Id. at 197. 
 31 Id. 
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especially for children and families.32 These assumptions have resulted in 
both Administrations’ calls for a border wall, family detention, and the 
speedy disposition of cases through “rocket dockets” in immigration courts 
as a means of deterring unauthorized crossings.33 They have also led to 
draconian public benefit laws that attempt to promote “self-deportation” by 
limiting access to basic necessities such as work, housing, and schooling, 
and otherwise making the lives of undocumented immigrants more 
difficult.34 In addition, President Trump’s executive orders punishing use of 
public benefits35 or restricting employer-sponsored migration36 assume that 
immigrants come to the United States to take jobs and public benefits, and 
that their willingness to come in contravention of immigration law reflects 
a desire to exploit and disrespect the rule of law. 
These false and uncritically adopted presumptions in border policy 
overlook sociological evidence of the factors driving migration. Studies of 
migration offer several theories for why people migrate that contravene the 
notion that a border wall would stop immigration. Sociologist Douglas 
Massey has cast doubt on the neoclassical push-pull factor model, which 
presumes that individuals conduct cost-benefit analyses in their decisions to 
migrate from less-developed economies for job opportunities.37 Massey 
offers an alternative interpretation: that undocumented immigration is 
 
 32 See Memorandum from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Jeh Charles Johnson to Acting Director of U.S. 
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Thomas S. Winkowski et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NP77-BD3D]. The deterrence assumption behind the policy is revealed in 
congressional testimony and presidential speeches from the Obama Administration. See, e.g., Statement 
of Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 10, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/10/statement-secretary-
homeland-security-jeh-johnson-senate-committee-appropriations [https://perma.cc/B2TE-VS4D]. 
 33 The term “rocket docket” refers to the Obama Administration’s use of prioritized docketing in 
immigration court. See, e.g., With the Immigration Court’s Rocket Docket Many Unrepresented 
Families Quickly Ordered Deported, TRAC IMMIGR. REP. (Oct. 18, 2016), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/441/ [https://perma.cc/LMZ2-E7TV]. 
 34 For example, in R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2015), the DHS, relying 
on Jonathan Hiskey et al., Democracy, Governance, and Emigration Intentions in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 49 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 89 (2014), argued that family detention was necessary to 
halt chain migration. Professor Hiskey said his report was used for contentions not supported by his 
research. See R.I.L-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 190. The D.C. District Court said that the DHS evidence of a 
security threat was too weak to justify detention as deterrence. See id. 
 35 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 18 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-30/pdf/2017-02102.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96KE-HKC6] (Section 5 of the Order expands the list of noncitizens subject to 
deportation to include those who abused public benefit programs). 
 36 Buy American and Hire American, Exec. Order No. 13,788, 82 Fed. Reg. 76 (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-04-21/pdf/2017-08311.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD4F-H2BB]. 
 37 DOUGLAS MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA 
OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 8–10, 105–41 (2003). 
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partly the result of perverse effects of U.S. border policy.38 In Massey’s 
account, border control produces the illegality it is meant to prevent by 
blocking circular migration patterns that would otherwise be preferred by 
migrant families.39 Recent counts show that the number of border 
apprehensions is down,40 but this is partly because of improving economic 
conditions in Mexican migration and not solely related to enforcement 
actions.41 Relatedly, policymakers’ assumptions that immigrants migrate to 
manipulate work benefits,42 obtain public education and social benefits,43 
and procure family sponsorship44 ignore evidence that these factors do not 
 
 38 See id. See generally Alejandro Portes & József Böröcz, Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical 
Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation, 23 INTL. MIGRATION REV. 606 (1989) 
(surveying common theories about labor migration and presenting alternative hypotheses). 
 39 See MASSEY ET AL., supra note 37, at 105–41. 
 40 While border apprehensions have decreased, there is disagreement about the size of the decrease 
and its cause. Compare Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Return to Rule of 
Law in Trump Administration Marked by Increase in Key Immigration Statistics (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/return-rule-law-trump-administration-marked-increase-key-
immigration-statistics [https://perma.cc/6D2Q-6XG3], with independent fact checking in D’Angelo 
Gore & Eugene Kiely, Trump’s Border Boast, FACTCHECK.ORG (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.factcheck.org/2017/07/trumps-border-boast [https://perma.cc/JUL4-FKHD]. 
 41 See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, More Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. 
(Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/11/19/more-mexicans-leaving-than-coming-to-the-
u-s [https://perma.cc/93JC-VSRD] (reporting net loss from 2009 to 2014); Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, 
Mexican Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 17 2016), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-immigrants-united-states [https://perma.cc/GB2H-
MLMT] (reporting Mexican migration declined 2006–16). 
 42 Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s September 5, 2017 speech laid out reasons for rescinding the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) immigration policy: “The effect of this unilateral 
executive amnesty, among other things, contributed to a surge of unaccompanied minors on the 
southern border that yielded terrible humanitarian consequences. It also denied jobs to hundreds of 
thousands of Americans by allowing those same jobs to go to illegal aliens.” Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, Remarks on DACA, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-daca 
[https://perma.cc/BFQ2-YQA8]. The Obama Administration’s DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson believed a 
version of this claim for Central American children. See Memorandum from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. 
Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 32. See generally SARIT COHEN-GOLDNER ET AL., HIGH-SKILLED 
IMMIGRATION IN A GLOBAL LABOR MARKET (Berry R. Chiswick ed., 2011). 
 43 See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (Aug. 22, 1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.) (2016). Economists David Card and Giovanni Peri have clashed with George Borjas on the 
impacts of immigrant workers on native workers. Compare GEORGE BORJAS, IMMIGRATION 
ECONOMICS (2014), with DAVID CARD & GIOVANNI PERI, IMMIGRATION ECONOMICS: A REVIEW 
(2016) (describing George Borjas’s IMMIGRATION ECONOMICS as a “one-sided view of immigration, 
with little or no attention to the growing body of work that offers a more nuanced picture of how 
immigrants fit into the host country market and affect native workers.”). 
 44 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Off. Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Sessions’ Statement 
on Immigration Reform (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-
statement-immigration-reform [https://perma.cc/DHY3-J7YY] (discussing “family chain migration”). 
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by themselves drive migration decisions. Instead, migration entails more 
complex decision-making. Moreover, the initial reasons to migrate may 
evolve into a different decision about whether to remain and where to 
reside within the United States.45 
These mistaken understandings of unauthorized migration are even 
more pronounced in the context of forced migration. The Central American 
border surge has been primarily the result of immigrants fleeing 
persecution, and, therefore, has not been deterred by border crackdowns, 
priority docketing in immigration courts, and family detention policies. 
Copious expert testimony has demonstrated that country conditions in 
Central America propel migrants to take the risk of unauthorized migration; 
many of these migrants turn themselves over to ICE and file affirmative 
asylum applications in the belief that they have a legal right to remain in 
the United States.46 Professor Ingrid Eagly’s research on family detention 
shows that practices of detention do not deter forced migration and that 
increased staffing and expedited procedures to reduce immigration court 
delays do not overcome enticements for those seeking asylum to stay in the 
United States.47 
Policies of self-deportation and “enforcement by attrition” make many 
of the same false assumptions about factors driving unauthorized migration 
to the United States. The most prominent of these is Arizona’s S.B. 1070 
“show me your papers” provision.48 A coalition of civil rights groups 
settled a lawsuit and the ACLU filed a separate racial profiling lawsuit 
against Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio for racially biased 
 
 45 MASSEY ET AL., supra note 37, at 9–12. 
 46 See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN ON THE RUN: UNACCOMPANIED 
CHILDREN LEAVING CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/56fc266f4.html [https://perma.cc/K5KX-ZJY2]; UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES 
FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO (2015), 
http://www.unhcr.org/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html [https://perma.cc/NDB7-
B97V]. 
 47 See Ingrid V. Eagly et al., Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family 
Detention, 106 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). Cf. Doris Meissner, Upfront Hearings a Must to Stem 
the Tide of Border-Crossing Children, DALLAS NEWS (June 2014), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2014/06/22/upfront-hearings-a-must-to-stem-tide-of-
border-crossing-children [https://perma.cc/88EV-MJXD] (former INS Commissioner noting the theory 
of delay as a pull factor). 
 48 See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); Fact Sheet for S.B. 1070, ARIZ. LEG. (Jan. 
15, 2010), https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/summary/s.1070pshs.doc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4C22-3JYB] (requiring state agencies to assist federal immigration authorities and 
criminalizing the hiring of certain aliens). 
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immigration enforcement practices.49 Litigants also challenged S.B. 1070 
provisions intended to encourage self-deportation.50 Social science evidence 
shows that it is more likely these draconian circumstances encourage 
immigrants to move from one state to another within the United States 
rather than discourage their initial migration to the United States.51 The 
experience of copycat laws in Utah and southern states like Alabama, 
Georgia, and South Carolina further vindicate that these are patterns of 
internal migration that channel, rather than eradicate, unauthorized 
migration.52 
Some of these policies rest upon contestable facts about the causes of 
migration, where there is reasonable disagreement among experts. But 
others rest on disregard of social science and professional expertise, or on 
misrepresentation of facts in the service of a political agenda. 
B. Criminal Aliens and Sanctuary Cities 
An equally strong belief in immigrant criminality has motivated recent 
federal immigration policies that prioritize enforcement against criminal 
aliens and more recently, punish sanctuary cities for resisting ICE requests 
to transfer these criminal aliens to detention. Examples include Congress’s 
expansion of the criminal grounds for deportation and eradication of 
prosecutorial discretion,53 the Obama Administration’s ICE priorities for 
removals,54 and the Trump Administration’s targeting of criminal aliens as 
 
 49 For background on racial profiling lawsuit against Joe Arpaio, see Ortega Melendres, et al. v. 
Arpaio, et al., ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/ortega-melendres-et-al-v-arpaio-et-al 
[https://perma.cc/HY2A-DJBC] (last updated Sept. 13, 2017). For reports on the effects of other 
“enforcement by attrition” and “self-deportation” policies, see Alexandra Filindra, The Myth of “Self-
Deportation,” IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 30, 2012), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/myth-self-deportation [https://perma.cc/CU4D-
M58S]. 
 50 See Ortega Melendres, et al., supra note 49. 
 51 See generally LEAH MUSE-ORLINOFF, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STAYING PUT BUT STILL IN THE 
SHADOWS: UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY DESPITE STRICT LAWS (2012) 
(finding most undocumented immigrants stay in the country and, at best, anti-immigrant laws prompt 
them to move within the United States); Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Impact of 
Local Immigration Regulation: An Empirical Analysis, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 485 (2010), reprinted in 
31 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 687 (2010) (finding a negative effect on employment and wages). 
 52 See id.; see also NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., SB 1070 FOUR YEARS LATER LESSONS LEARNED, 
(2014), https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforcement/sb-1070-lessons-learned 
[https://perma.cc/WR5W-WZ2A] (describing S.B. 1070 copycat laws). 
 53 The INA grounds for deportability were significantly expanded in the 1996 Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). See Norton Tooby & Joseph Justin Rollin, Evolution of the Definition of 
Aggravated Felony, LAW OFFICES OF NORTON TOOBY, 
http://nortontooby.com/pdf/FreeChecklists/EvoAggFelonyStatute.pdf [https://perma.cc/223Z-96ND]. 
 54 See supra note 32. 
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gang members and terrorists.55 These policies are meant to exclude 
undesirable immigrants from the United States and prevent incidents of 
violent crimes within the United States, as well as prioritize enforcement 
against the most dangerous immigrants. 
But numerous studies show that the belief that immigrants commit 
more crime is false.56 A 2015 American Immigration Council report 
showed that immigrants do not actually commit more crime.57 Think tanks 
from across the political spectrum have reached consistent results.58 An 
eminent task force of social scientists reported that immigrants commit 
more crime after spending time in the United States, mirroring trends in the 
general population, as opposed to before they enter the country.59 These 
reports demonstrate how stereotypes and perceptions of immigrant crime 
are driven by the construction of immigrant criminality rather than facts.60 
 
 55 The DHS and DOJ trumpet Operation Raging Bull as an enforcement action targeting MS-13 
gang members that has resulted in hundreds of arrests. See ICE’s ‘Operation Raging Bull’ Nets 267 MS-
13 Arrests, ICE (last updated Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/features/raging-bull 
[https://perma.cc/2TYD-8ZDC]. 
 56 ICE spokesperson James Schwab resigned on March 12, 2018 because he felt that he could no 
longer perpetuate misleading facts about immigrants and the effects of sanctuary policies on the dangers 
they posed to their community. See Hamed Aleaziz, San Francisco’s ICE Spokesman Quits, Disputes 
Agency’s Claim that 800 Eluded Arrest, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/ICE-spokesman-said-to-quit-over-officials-12748022.php 
[https://perma.cc/63Z5-MHTT]. Schwab went on to say that “It’s the job of a public affairs officer to 
offer transparency for the agency you work for . . . I’ve never been in a situation when I’ve been asked 
to ignore the facts because it was more convenient . . . .” Id. Schwab later told CNN, “I just couldn’t 
bear the burden -- continuing on as a representative of the agency and charged with upholding integrity, 
knowing that information was false.” Dan Simon, ICE Spokesman in SF Resigns and Slams Trump 
Administration Officials, CNN (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/12/politics/ice-
spokesman-resigns-san-francisco/index.html [https://perma.cc/LV6R-MFXF]. 
 57 WALTER A. EWING ET AL., AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2015), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immig
ration_in_the_united_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS9Z-T97M]. 
 58 Similar findings have been reached across the political spectrum by the Sentencing Project, the 
Cato Institute, and the National Academy of Science Commission on Immigrant Integration. See, e.g., 
Alex Nowrasteh, The Fatal Flaw in John R. Lott Jr.’s Study on Illegal Immigrant Crime in Arizona, 
CATO INST. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.cato.org/blog/fatal-flaw-john-r-lott-jrs-study-illegal-immigrant-
crime-arizona [https://perma.cc/2RWQ-EQST]; Salvador Rizzo, Questions Raised About Study That 
Links Undocumented Immigrants to Higher Crime, WASH. POST. (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/03/21/questions-raised-about-a-study-
that-links-undocumented-immigrants-to-higher-crime/?utm_term=.3b4fbe87c114 
[https://perma.cc/BR92-2JN6]. In addition, Professor Emily Ryo has found that immigration judges are 
more likely to predict that Central Americans will be a danger to the public in bond hearings. See Emily 
Ryo, Predicting Danger in Immigration Courts, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2018) (on file with 
author). 
 59 See NAS Report, supra note 28. 
 60 See generally Jennifer M. Chacon, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012); César Cuauhtémoc Garcîa Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 
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These social science facts counter the Trump Administration’s claims that 
Mexico is not sending us their best, that they are sending rapists and 
murderers, and that immigrants are “bad hombres.”61 They also counter the 
Obama Administration’s assumptions about dangerous criminal aliens 
justifying priorities, expansion of statutory grounds for deportation, and 
widespread use of detention as measures to prevent crime or promote 
public safety.62 In addition, social scientists have shown that street gangs 
made up of Central American immigrants, such as MS-13, were formed in 
Los Angeles and led to migrant criminality after immigrants returned from 
deportation, rather than criminality preceding migration to the United 
States.63 
False belief in immigrant criminality has also led to the Trump 
Administration’s public hostility towards sanctuary city policies, which 
seek to restrict local police communication with federal immigration 
officials, and President Trump’s many attempts to penalize the jurisdictions 
that do not cooperate.64 The high-profile killing of Kate Steinle by an 
undocumented immigrant, whom San Francisco police had previously 
released, fueled the public impression that sanctuary policies enable 
violence.65 But underneath the impassioned politics and public scandals, it 
 
2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457 (2014); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
 61 See Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-
a-presidential-bid/?utm_term=.7ee1059ec012 [https://perma.cc/493H-86J8]; Maya Rhodan, Donald 
Trump Raises Eyebrows With ‘Bad Hombres’ Line, TIME (Oct. 19, 2016), 
http://time.com/4537847/donald-trump-bad-hombres [https://perma.cc/R8C8-L99J]. 
 62 See Memorandum from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 32. 
 63 See CLAIRE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RES. SERV., GANGS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (2016). 
Attorney General Sessions also conflates unaccompanied children from Central America with the gang 
members and with DACA youth migration in a subsequent policy speech. See Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, Remarks about Carrying Out the President’s Immigration Priorities, OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GEN. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-
delivers-remarks-about-carrying-out-presidents-immigration [https://perma.cc/WF78-NVZG] (“The 
open-borders lobby talks a lot about kids—those who are here unlawfully . . . . After the previous 
administration announced [DACA] in 2012, the number of unaccompanied children coming here nearly 
doubled in one year. The next year, it doubled again. I doubt that was a coincidence. DACA encouraged 
potentially tens of thousands of vulnerable children to make the dangerous journey North.”). 
 64 See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 18 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-30/pdf/2017-02102.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96KE-HKC6] (defining “sanctuary jurisdictions” as those that “willfully refuse to 
comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373”). The term “sanctuary” or “sanctuary city” is not defined by statute. See 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support, United States v. 
California, No. 18-264 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018). 
 65 See Julia Preston, San Francisco Murder Case Exposes Lapses in Immigration Enforcement, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/san-francisco-murder-case-
exposes-lapses-in-immigration-enforcement.html [https://perma.cc/R8B5-K36N]. 
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is an empirical issue whether sanctuary cities lead to more violent crime 
from immigrants. Professor Tom Wong, a U.C. San Diego political 
scientist, conducted a study which concluded that “[c]rime is statistically 
significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to nonsanctuary 
counties.”66 This study was misquoted by Attorney General Jeff Sessions in 
his statement that sanctuary cities facilitate more crime.67 A similar 
misattribution happened with a study authored by Professor Loren 
Collingwood and colleagues at U.C. Riverside, which has been 
misinterpreted to support the same conclusion that sanctuary jurisdictions 
are more dangerous.68 Many law enforcement officials actually believe that 
sanctuary policies prevent crime, and that jurisdictions without such 
policies inadvertently promote crime by creating immigrant mistrust of the 
police force. For example, a blue ribbon task force consisting of law 
enforcement officials found sufficient cause for concern that they issued a 
split recommendation to abandon the Secure Communities program, a 
program that required county jails to assist federal immigration agents by 
granting immigration detainers.69 The task force found the program was 
ineffective and perceived by the public as unfair, because minor offenses 
were conflated with violent crime.70 Litigation in San Francisco and 
Chicago challenging President Trump’s sanctuary city sanctions suggest 
that the policies are deficient due to their arbitrary adoption and other 
constitutional concerns.71 
 
 66 See Tom K. Wong, The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297366/the-effects-of-
sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy [https://perma.cc/S6CC-EB4G]. 
 67 Attorney General Jeff Sessions said at a White House briefing, “When cities and states refuse to 
help enforce immigration laws, our nation is less safe . . . . Failure to deport aliens who are convicted of 
criminal offenses puts whole communities at risk, especially immigrant communities in the very 
sanctuary jurisdictions that seek to protect the perpetrators.” Emily Schultheis, Jeff Sessions Calls on 
Sanctuary Cities to “Enforce Our Immigration Laws,” CBS NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jeff-sessions-calls-on-sanctuary-cities-to-enforce-our-immigration-
laws [https://perma.cc/TU5E-9GJ4]. 
 68 See Benjamin Gonzalez et al., The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and 
Undocumented Immigration, URB. AFFAIRS REV. (May 7, 2017); see also Loren Collingwood et al., 
Sanctuary Cities Do Not Experience an Increase in Crime, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/03/sanctuary-cities-do-not-
experience-an-increase-in-crime/?utm_term=.754e6b7d1bf0 [https://perma.cc/7BRQ-FAQ3]. 
 69 See HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 27 (2011). 
 70 See id. at 24. 
 71 See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 508 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding a 
likelihood of success on the merits in challenge to Trump sanctuary city sanctions due to separation of 
powers, arbitrariness, the Tenth Amendment, and other considerations); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 
264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2017), reh’g denied, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 5499167 (N.D. Ill. 
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What would it take instead to encourage local compliance with federal 
immigration enforcement against criminal aliens? Attorney General 
Sessions assumes sanctions and sticks work best, as with his threats to 
withhold federal public safety grants to noncooperating jurisdictions72 or 
his lawsuit challenging California’s sanctuary policies.73 But social science 
evidence demonstrates these types of policies rest on a misunderstanding of 
what it takes to get sanctuary cities to comply.74 According to procedural 
justice research, threatening sanctuary jurisdictions with sanctions is not 
going to encourage voluntary cooperation or compliance.75 In work inspired 
by social psychologist Tom Tyler, legal scholars studying immigration 
detainers—federal requests for local police to detain criminal aliens who 
would otherwise be eligible for release—have found that the primary 
motivator of local noncompliance is lack of legitimacy of these requests.76 
Although the time frame of the study makes it difficult to prove 
conclusively, President Obama’s replacement Priorities Enforcement 
Program (PEP), which pulled back on the Secure Communities program by 
requesting notification of release rather than holding and reserving detainer 
requests for more serious crimes, would have led to greater compliance.77 
Additionally, my prior research, informed by the procedural justice studies 
of Tom Tyler, hypothesized an increase in the number of jurisdictions 
resisting cooperation after President Trump’s subsequent reinstatement of 
Secure Communities.78 And indeed, President Trump’s Executive Order 
restoring Secure Communities79 and Attorney General Sessions’s threats to 
 
Nov. 16, 2017) (finding a likelihood of success on the merits in challenge to sanctuary city sanctions 
due to lack of congressional delegation of authority to executive). 
 72 Press Release: Justice Department Sends Letter to 29 Jurisdictions Regarding Their Compliance 
with 8 U.S.C. 1373, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sends-letters-29-jurisdictions-regarding-their-
compliance-8-usc-1373 [https://perma.cc/N4SN-H6TU]. 
 73 See Complaint, United States v. California, No. 18-264 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018). 
 74 See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 76 Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance, Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 
62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 622 (2015); Emily Ryo, Deciding Whether to Cross: Norms and Economics of 
Unauthorized Migration, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 574, 574 (2013). 
 77 See Priority Enforcement Program, ICE (last updated June 22, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/pep 
[https://perma.cc/65UV-A9V3]; see also Memorandum from Homeland Sec. Sec’y Jeh Charles 
Johnson, supra note 32 (eradicating Secure Communities and discrediting the tactic of using 
immigration detainers to boost deportation). 
 78 Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities 
After Secure Communities, 36 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 335, 348 (2015); see also Memorandum 
from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 32. 
 79 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 18 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-30/pdf/2017-02102.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96KE-HKC6]. 
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sanctuary cities and states80 should lead to continuing noncompliance. 
Litigation in San Francisco81 and Chicago82 challenging Trump’s Executive 
Order shows that these policies have not encouraged greater cooperation 
with federal policies. Beyond the litigation in San Francisco and Chicago, 
more than thirty states or localities have adopted sanctuary policies 
following Trump’s Executive Order, most strengthening rather than 
weakening sanctuary provisions.83 In one of the most far-reaching sanctuary 
policies, California adopted a sanctuary law that is even bolder and broader 
in scope: California S.B. 54 goes a step further than not honoring detainers, 
and directs law enforcement agencies to ignore federal requests for release 
dates as well (with caveats for some crimes), in addition to not allowing 
local law enforcement to house detainees under contract.84 California has 
additionally adopted state laws restricting private employers’ cooperation 
with worksite enforcement.85 Not every jurisdiction has moved in this 
direction, but the trends are notable.86 
Policies that promote public safety or allocate resources to prioritize 
criminal behavior among immigrants over less serious offenses are not 
unreasonable. However, enacting such policies on the basis of false or 
exaggerated claims of immigrant criminality, rather than on the basis of 
 
 80 See supra note 72. 
 81 County of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497. 
 82 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017), reh’g denied, No. 17 C 5720, 
2017 WL 5499167 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2017). 
 83 See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 58 B.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (thirty-seven sanctuary city policies); Muzaffar Chishti & Sarah Pierce, Despite 
Little Action on Sanctuary Cities, States and Localities Rush to Respond to Rhetoric, MIGRATION INFO. 
SOURCE (Apr. 20, 2017) (thirty-three sanctuary city policies). The list of policies is regularly updated at 
Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”—Online Appendix: Home, 
WESTMINSTER L. LIBR. (last updated Apr. 8, 2018), http://libguides.law.du.edu/c.php?g=705342 
[https://perma.cc/5QHT-Y3EX]. 
 84  S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess., 2017 Cal. Stat. ch. 495 (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282, 
7282.5 (West 2017), adding CAL. GOV’T CODE ch. 17.25 (West 2017), and repealing CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 11369 (WEST 2017)). 
 85 A.B. 450, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess., 2017 Cal. Stat. ch. 492 (adding CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7285.1–
7285.3 (West 2017), CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 90.2, 1019.2 (West 2017)). 
 86 The Migration Policy Institute, the National Conference of State Legislators, and Pew Charitable 
Trusts report that some counties are moving away from sanctuary policies under the threat of sanctions 
or as they get more assurances that they will not be held liable for criminal procedure abuses that may 
arise in the use of immigration detainers. See Chishti & Pierce, supra note 83; Tim Henderson, Sheriffs 
Still Looking for Clarify on Deportation, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 10, 2017), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/02/10/sheriffs-still-looking-for-
clarity-on-deportation [https://perma.cc/UM8Y-2SL7]. At the state level, see Complaint, City of San 
Antonio v. Texas, No. 5:17-cv-489, (W.D. Tx. June 1, 2017) (Texas litigation challenging state law 
S.B. 4 that restricts sanctuary policies). 
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legitimate social science research, damages immigrants and communities 
alike. 
C. Exclusion of Refugees 
Further, the Trump Administration’s exclusion of refugees has 
exaggerated the national security threat presented by refugees from 
Muslim-majority countries and overlooked evidence of the rigor of vetting 
practices. As a result, in a move to reverse President Obama’s increased 
refugee admissions, the Trump Administration’s policies lowered the 
refugee cap by more than half.87 President Trump’s 45,000 cap is the lowest 
level recommended since 1980.88 
The premise of the lower levels of refugee admission is that the 
refugees from Muslim-majority countries pose a national security threat 
during a time of terrorist attacks and the corollary belief that vetting 
practices have been inadequate to stem this threat.89 Then-acting Attorney 
General Sally Yates expressed reservations about the legality of the policy, 
leading to her abrupt firing.90 State Department dissent from 1,000 
diplomats about the security threat was similarly squelched.91 However, the 
 
 87 See U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement Ceilings and Number of Refugees Admitted, 1980-Present, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (analysis of Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS) 
data from the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration) (last visited May 8, 
2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/us-annual-refugee-resettlement-
ceilings-and-number-refugees-admitted-united [https://perma.cc/VQ8F-MWUG]. 
 88 See Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF 
POPULATION (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/262168.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W33P-8M5Q]; Refugees and Asylees in the U.S., MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 7, 
2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-asylees-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/CS2E-MFWC]. 
 89 There have been many examples of President Trump and candidate Trump making statements 
labeling refugees as terrorists and security risks. See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump on the 
Administration’s National Security Strategy, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-administrations-national-
security-strategy [https://perma.cc/Q8YP-XT24]. These have been part of the grounds for the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits enjoining the travel ban as religious or national origin discrimination that violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the INA. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Program 
v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 90 Ryan Lizza, Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump, NEW YORKER (May 29, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/why-sally-yates-stood-up-to-trump 
[https://perma.cc/K4LT-W9JM]. 
 91 See Barbara Plett Usher, Trump Travel Ban: Diplomats Register Dissent, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38778261 [https://perma.cc/76E5-BK88]. The 
dismissal of State Department expertise has contributed to a troublesome mass exodus among senior 
diplomats. See Dan De Luce & Robbie Gramer, U.S. Diplomat’s Resignation Signals Wider Exodus 
from State Department, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 9, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/09/u-s-
diplomat-resigns-warning-of-state-departments-diminished-role-diplomacy-national-security-tillerson-
africa-somalia-south-sudan [https://perma.cc/L4MU-6BBL]. 
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Fourth and Ninth Circuit litigation subsequently blocking the travel ban as 
a whole contains specific statements of concern about insufficient evidence 
of the security threat92 and possibly irrational and discriminatory anti-
Muslim bias.93 Refugee service providers, news outlets, and past 
government officials have tried to describe the rigorous vetting of refugees 
overseas,94 and news analysts have pointed out that those who flee a tyrant 
government share the United States’ dislike of the regime, not a sympathy 
for the goals of the oppressor.95 Nevertheless, under the veil of anti-Muslim 
suspicion long present in the United States, recent policies continue to 
conflate terrorists and their victims.96 The false equivalence of refugees 
with terrorists has led to reductions and outright suspensions in refugee 
admissions, as well as calls for increased vetting prior to admission.97 It has 
also inspired more burdensome procedures for obtaining a green card and 
subsequently naturalizing from within the United States.98 Finally, this 
 
 92 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Program, 857 F.3d at 596 (“EO-2’s text does little to bolster any 
national security rationale . . . .”); Hawaii, 878 F.3d at 699 (“[T]he President has failed to make 
sufficient findings that the ‘entry of certain classes of aliens would be detrimental to the national 
interest.’”). 
 93 On the second travel ban, for example, the Fourth Circuit said “EO-2 cannot be divorced from 
the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it. In light of this, we find that the 
reasonable observer would likely conclude that EO-2’s primary purpose is to exclude persons from the 
United States on the basis of their religious beliefs,” Int’l Refugee Assistance Program, 857 F.3d at 601, 
and that the ban “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination.” Id. at 572. The 
Plaintiffs’ proposed Second Amended Complaint in the District of Hawaii case contains similar 
language in opposition to the second travel ban: “[T]he [Executive] Order began life as a Muslim ban” 
and the latest ban plainly “discriminat[es] on the basis of nationality.” Proposed Second Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 28, 34, Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. 
Haw. 2017) (No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC). 
 94 See Natasha Hall, Refugees are Already Vigorously Vetted. I Know Because I Vetted Them, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/01/refugees-
are-already-vigorously-vetted-i-know-because-i-vetted-them [https://perma.cc/ZPN6-A47S]; U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions 
[https://perma.cc/5FGB-YRMG]. 
 95 Michael G. Mullen, The Wrong Time to Cut Back on Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/opinion/refugee-resettlement-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/EH4D-XTN3] (“Refugees are victims of extremist groups and brutal governments. 
They become patriotic, hard-working Americans.”). 
 96 For the longer perspective on anti-Muslim bias, see generally Leti Volpp, The Citizen and The 
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002). See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law 
National Security Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669 (2017) (linking post-9/11 Muslim Registry with 
contemporary anti-Muslim policies); Seema Sohi, Presentation: Race, Surveillance, and South Asian 
Exclusion, COLO. LAW CITIZENSHIP & EQUALITY COLLOQUIUM (Nov. 2, 2017) (on file with author). 
 97 See Gabrielle Levy, Trump Administration Adds New Hurdle for Green Card Seekers, U.S. 
NEWS (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-12-28/trump-
administration-adds-new-hurdles-for-green-card-seekers [https://perma.cc/35MC-4RVK]. 
 98 See USCIS to Expand In-Person Interview Requirements for Certain Permanent Residency 
Applicants, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV. (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-
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misconception has created widespread hostility against refugees, especially 
those from the Middle East.99 
The social science evidence also disproves the claim that refugees 
receive more from society than they contribute.100 This view presumably 
stems from the relative costs of resettling refugees within the United States 
(including the affirmative assistance with integration in the form of job 
placement, language training, and social workers) and from widespread 
beliefs in welfare abuse or fraud.101 But the facts do not bear out this 
misperception. The New York Times reported in Fall 2017 that the U.S. 
government suppressed an analysis stating that refugees benefit the 
economy.102 This finding complements evidence from many prior studies 
showing that refugees integrate and naturalize impressively, relative to 
other immigrant groups and predictors of success.103 Still the narrative of 
the refugee welfare queen has been used to justify presidential policies that 




 99 See Ideologically Polarized Views of Threats to the Country, in THE WORLD FACING TRUMP: 
PUBLIC SEES ISIS, CYBERATTACKS, NORTH KOREA AS TOP THREATS, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.people-press.org/2017/01/12/the-world-facing-trump-public-sees-isis-cyberattacks-north-
korea-as-top-threats [https://perma.cc/DAE8-ZNH5] (finding majority of Republicans fear Middle 
Eastern refugees as threat to US). 
 100 See infra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
 101 Randy Capps & Kathleen Newland, The Integration Outcomes of U.S. Refugees: Successes and 
Challenges, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (2015), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integration-
outcomes-us-refugees-successes-and-challenges [https://perma.cc/K8X7-U7SK]. Compare critical 
reports and figures on settlement costs. See James Simpson, Shut Down America’s Refugee Programs 
Before They Turn Us Into Germany, FEDERALIST (Jan. 4, 2017), 
http://thefederalist.com/2017/01/04/shut-americas-refugee-programs-turn-us-germany 
[https://perma.cc/R73Z-JPVC] (on asylum fraud); Nation’s Top Security Officials’ Concerns On 
Refugee Vetting, HOMELAND SEC. COMMITTEE, (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://homeland.house.gov/press/nations-top-security-officials-concerns-on-refugee-vetting 
[https://perma.cc/TTK4-E7PY] (on security threats). 
 102 Rejected Report Shows Revenue Brought In by Refugees, (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/19/us/politics/document-Refugee-Report.html 
[https://perma.cc/C9ZX-M3C8] (leaked report rejected by President Trump); Stella Burch Elias, 
Presentation: Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Levels for Fiscal Year 2018, COLO. LAW 
CITIZENSHIP & EQUALITY COLLOQUIUM (Oct. 5, 2017). 
 103 See, e.g., Randy Capps & Kathleen Newland, The Integration Outcomes of U.S. Refugees: 
Successes and Challenges, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (2015), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integration-outcomes-us-refugees-successes-and-challenges 
[https://perma.cc/PXG6-SNZP]; COLO. OFFICE OF ECON. SECURITY, The Refugee Integration Survey 
and Evaluation (RISE) Year Five: Final Report, (2016) 
https://cbsdenver.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/rise-year-5-report-feb-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V67-
3D46]. 
 104 See Bernadette Ludwig, ‘Wiping the Refugee Dust from My Feet’: Advantages and Burdens of 
Refugee Status and the Refugee Label, 54 INT’L MIGRATION 5, 5 (2013). Compare successful legal 
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Stemming security threats is an unassailable goal in immigration 
policymaking. However, seeking to do so without understanding the 
motivations of both refugees and terrorists is costly. It can lead to unduly 
restrictive admissions, burdensome vetting, and barriers to integration for 
refugees. It can sow social division and alienation that give rise to domestic 
unrest and national security risks. It can lead the United States to violate 
obligations to international human rights and endanger its relationships 
with other countries as well. 
III. LEVERAGING EXPERTISE IN IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 
Whether through legal avenues or nonlegal ones, policymakers need 
to be held accountable for the quality of their policies and decisions. This 
Part proposes measures to enhance the role of expertise and social science 
evidence in agency decision-making. In general, the recommendations 
focus on how decisions are made and strive to enhance norms of good 
governance and to bring immigration policy into alignment with ordinary 
administrative and constitutional principles. 
A. Bringing Presidential Policymaking into the Administrative State 
Presidential policymaking and government statements might be 
outside conventional legal mechanisms of accountability. However, they 
can and should be supported by administrative involvement that is within 
the scope of accountability mechanisms. Generally, a president announcing 
a sweeping executive action ought to consult with the heads of the affected 
agencies and encourage promulgation of further regulations to carry out 
those executive orders. Thus, one way presidents can respect expertise is to 
involve civil servants. As explained in Part I, these professionals offer 
crucial long-term experience and some independence from politics. These 
qualities balance presidential influence during a time when presidential 
action is dominating immigration policymaking. 
Another benefit of involving agencies is that administrative procedure 
promotes fact-finding and transparency in decision-making. Bringing 
agency policies into the domain of the APA would lead to increased use of 
legislative rulemaking. The notice and comment period, in particular, 
requires that the DHS be more transparent about changes in policy and 
practice, creates opportunities for public engagement around those changes, 
and enables all parties to introduce facts into policy deliberations. If these 
 
challenges to the DACA rescission that acknowledge arbitrariness for mistakenly presuming the 
illegality of the program and for overlooking the contributions of DACA recipients to U.S. society. See, 
e.g., Order Denying FRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissal and Granting Provisional Relief, Regents of The 
University of California v. DHS, No 3:17-cv-05211-WHA (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018). 
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basic administrative principles applied with equal force to immigration law 
as they do to other areas of administrative law, they would prevent 
individual abuses of discretion, arbitrariness, and secrecy in immigration 
enforcement. However, they run counter to current practices of announcing 
immigration policies swiftly and abruptly, sometimes without even issuing 
guidance. Effective enforcement does require some latitude for discretion. 
However, discretion should not be wielded under a veil of secrecy 
whenever they involve law enforcement, national security, or other forms 
of immigration exceptionalism. 
Normalizing these administrative principles in immigration 
adjudication at the DOJ is difficult, but vital. An alien has the statutory 
right to a full and fair hearing and a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence on his or her own behalf.105 Yet these principles are only partially 
and problematically enforced in immigration court. Policymaking through 
administrative adjudication is vexing as a general matter. The immigration 
courts and the BIA serve similar functions to administrative law judges and 
other administrative appeals units, but they operate with even less 
independence, less public oversight, and less procedure. Immigration 
adjudication is neither informal nor formal adjudication under the APA, 
meaning that its procedures are permitted to deviate from normal practice. 
The chief immigration judge has called on Congress and the President to 
safeguard the independence of immigration judges from political decision-
making; one of her suggestions is to create an Article I immigration court, 
rather than housing immigration judges in the Department of Justice.106 
These recommendations run contrary to current proposals that seek to 
weaken rather than strengthen the independence and professionalism of the 
immigration courts. For instance, Attorney General Sessions has suggested 
imposition of completion goals that would tilt EOIR decision-making 
toward removal.107 
 
 105 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 106 See Dana Leigh Marks, Immigrant Courts Should Be Independent—Not an Arm of the 
Administration, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 24, 2017) http://prospect.org/article/immigrant-courts-should-be-
independent-not-arm-administration [https://perma.cc/64UF-UFRF]. These longstanding calls for 
greater independence in immigration adjudication are even more necessary in the face of the Trump 
Administration. 
 107 Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Remarks to the EOIR, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Oct 12, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-
office-immigration-review [https://perma.cc/VDZ6-METW]; see also Letter from Donald J. Trump, 
President, to House and Senate Leaders & Immigration Principles and Policies (Oct. 8, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-letter-house-senate-
leaders-immigration-principles-policies [https://perma.cc/NW2Z-WKJA] (including language intending 
to “[e]stablish performance metrics for immigration judges”). 
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High-stakes policymaking and adjudication should not be made on the 
basis of an administrative process that does not allow it to gather facts 
reliably. The normalization of principles of administrative procedure in 
immigration policymaking and adjudication could encourage greater 
availability of social science expertise and improve agency reliance on 
good information instead of political influence alone.108 
B. Political Mechanisms to Improve the Quality of Evidence 
Political mechanisms can improve the quality of evidence in 
immigration policy. Congressional requests for information about 
immigration policies can push the DHS and the DOJ to describe the factual 
foundations of their policy decisions and hold them accountable to 
evidence-backed research about the effectiveness of policies. Congress 
could amend the APA or the INA to legislate a requirement that agency 
policies be supported by a factual record that facilitates subsequent review 
and that studies relied upon disclose the methods, assumptions, and data 
sources used in crafting their policies. Congress could modify requirements 
that significant rules already subject to notice and comment or regulatory 
impact analysis use the “best available evidence.”109 
More broadly, improving the quality and rationality of decision-
making in immigration policies using nonlegal avenues of accountability 
would fill the lacuna of judicial review. Holding immigration policy 
accountable to expertise through legal means is not easy because not all 
statements and policies about immigration are correctable through legal 
recourse. Moreover, many of these enforcement policies are the product of 
discretion and cannot be challenged on substantive grounds. President 
Trump’s Twitter statements regarding the purpose of the travel ban or 
Attorney General Sessions’s televised public statements on sanctuary cities 
are difficult to review, even if courts have taken notice.110 Many garden-
 
 108 A similar argument is made in Jill E. Family, Notice & Comment, Online Symposium: Is 
Immigration Law Administrative Law?, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (2017), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/online-symposium-is-immigration-law-administrative-law-introduction-by-jill-e-
family [https://perma.cc/RFY9-CW7C]. 
 109 Reeve Bull & Jerry Ellig, Judicial Review of Regulatory Impact Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 
69 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 730 (2017) (seeking to improve regulatory impact analysis requirements with a 
“best evidence” standard). 
 110 However, the DACA rescission is being challenged under the APA. See, e.g., Complaint for 
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3, Regents of the University of California v. DHS, No. 3:17-cv-
05211-WHA, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017) (“Defendants failed to ‘articulate a satisfactory explanation’ for 
their action that would enable a court to conclude that the decision was ‘the product of reasoned 
decisionmaking.’”) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). A Ninth Circuit hearing included discussion of how the federal 
government’s position squared with State Farm and agreed there must be a rational connection. See 
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variety immigration decisions are rendered by Congress to be unreviewable 
in court by the terms of the INA or subsequent jurisdiction-stripping 
statutes.111 Consequently, misinformation or misleading practices that 
intrude on sound immigration policymaking need to be addressed through 
nonlegal avenues of accountability such as public discourse and political 
action. Increasing attention is being paid to the use of FOIA to obtain 
essential information about immigration enforcement practices and 
incriminating evidence related to individuals targeted for removal as 
well.112 Improving the quality and rationality of decision-making under 
these constraints rests on an appeal to democratic and social norms more 
than courts. 
That said, all of these evidence-bolstering mechanisms would benefit 
subsequent review as well. Courts, who are subject nonexperts, could use 
either the procedural standards or the substantive information generated 
from compliance with those standards to more effectively review the 
rationality of the policies. Academic researchers, citizen advisory councils, 
and public interest organizations who are familiar with social science 
research would have more opportunities to inform policymaking and 
correct misstatements under such requirements as well. 
C. Strengthening Judicial Review of Immigration Policy. 
When courts do review immigration policies, they have difficulty 
holding immigration decision-makers accountable. Constitutional and 
statutory requirements for due process and other basic freedoms extend to 
immigrants. The First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due 
Process Clause apply to persons and not merely citizens, for example, and 
the INA includes its own procedural constraints. However, recent litigation 
activity notwithstanding,113 longstanding precedent shows that these 
 
Nicholas Iovino, Fight Over DACA Decision-Making Documents Hits 9th Circuit, COURTHOUSE NEWS 
SERVICE (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/fight-daca-decision-making-documents-
hits-9th-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/22FV-5ARJ]. 
 111 The AEDPA Sec. 242(a)(2)(C) precluded all judicial review of final removal orders of aliens 
deported for committing certain types of crimes, such as an “aggravated felony.” AEDPA § 440(a)–(b), 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105a(a)(10), 1182 (2000)). 
IIRIRA Sec. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) stripped judicial review of noncitizens in removal hearings concerning 
criminal aliens and matters other than final orders. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-
549 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000)). The REAL ID Act of 2005 precluded district court 
review of habeas cases and reaffirmed that discretionary claims were unreviewable. REAL ID Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 10913, § 106(a)(5), 119 Stat. 302, 316 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). These statutes 
have led to an insulation of BIA cases from scrutiny and widespread disparities. 
 112 See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3033196 [https://perma.cc/6AGU-SK7D]. 
 113 Federal courts have been actively reviewing recent immigration policies such as the travel ban, 
DACA rescission, and sanctuary city sanctions for both constitutional and statutory compliance. See, 
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constitutional and statutory provisions are often applied in a more relaxed 
fashion in the immigration context that disfavors immigrants.114 The INA is 
notoriously unclear and courts often prove unwilling to construe ambiguous 
provisions in favor of immigrants given that most decisions reside in the 
civil context, despite their high stakes. 
Courts are typically more deferential to immigration agencies in their 
policymaking than hornbook constitutional and administrative law doctrine 
would portend, whether due to background assumptions that immigration 
law is unique or due to the sheer complexity of immigration law. This is 
not always appropriate. Courts tend to overlook immigration courts’ 
inconsistent application of legal standards in their review of immigration 
court decisions and fail to consider that “crimmigration” cases involve 
interpretative matters under canons not well suited to the harsh 
consequences associated with detention and deportation. Factual findings 
routinely arise in immigration court even where the record is slim or where 
the fact-finding is not governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. In 
asylum cases that require an asylum seeker’s well-founded fear of 
persecution, for example, the BIA sometimes adopts State Department 
reports uncritically in an effort to challenge the petitioner’s claimed 
persecution, rather than bringing in other social science evidence that 
would question the assertions of those reports, and sometimes rejects expert 
testimony unreasonably. Mass adjudication and priority docketing further 
truncate due process in immigration proceedings. The resulting opinions 
and administrative appeals are not always well-reasoned and sometimes not 
reasoned at all. 
 
e.g., Hawaii, 878 F.3d 662; Order Denying FRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissal and Granting Provisional Relief, 
Regents of The University of California v. DHS, No. 3:17-cv-05211-WHA (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018); 
County of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497. Initial decisions suggest that some of these policies cannot 
withstand even the more relaxed judicial review that they currently face. For example, federal courts in 
the travel ban litigation have questioned the arbitrariness of banning refugees without more evidence of 
national security threat. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. Litigants challenging the 
rescission of DACA are asking for more explanation under the APA, after significant waffling and a 
bungled execution led to post office delays that jeopardized authorized renewals as untimely. See Liz 
Robbins, Post Office Fails to Deliver on Time, and DACA Applications Get Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/10/nyregion/post-office-mail-delays-daca-
applications.html [https://perma.cc/Q593-6PQP]. However, the final result in these cases remains to be 
seen since many of the decisions involve preliminary stages of litigation and conflicting rulings across 
the nation may prompt Supreme Court review. 
 114 Among many scholars critiquing immigration law along these lines, see Gabriel J. Chin, 
Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 
46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A 
Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 306 (2000); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 307, 312 (2000); Michael Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry: Devolution of the 
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001). 
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Requiring immigration agencies and immigration courts to engage in 
better data gathering and truthful reporting is critical to ensuring procedural 
fairness and substantive integrity in a policy area with such high stakes and 
such contested values. Courts should review immigration policy under 
normal standards of constitutional and statutory review.115 The Constitution 
should apply in force. Applicable standards for reviewing agency 
legislative actions would require courts to take a hard look at the rationality 
of agency decision-making, or at least be sure that the agency has taken a 
hard look and provided some kind of rational explanation for policy 
changes.116 A more searching review of immigration policy would curb the 
current informality and irregularity of policymaking and adjudicatory 
decision-making in the high-stakes arena of immigration. 
CONCLUSION 
The rejection of expertise in immigration policy goes beyond the 
singular issue of immigration and the singular Trump Administration. But 
it is particularly consequential in the midst of a populist moment that 
rejects expertise in the service of a virulent anti-immigrant policy agenda 
and that relies on missing or erroneous data to strip immigrants of their 
most basic rights. Immigration law is value-laden and subject to strong 
political pressure. It is not scientific law and may not lend itself to 
objective answers or singularly agreed upon solutions. However, it is also 
not a policy domain bereft of reason, expertise, or evidence. Even if the 
neutral expert in immigration policymaking is a myth, there should be 
norms to separate irresponsible immigration policies from normal shifts in 
administrative policies, priorities, and procedures.117 
The institutional purpose of agencies is to advance norms of expertise 
and reasoned decision-making. Building standards for immigration policy 
based on rationality, expertise, and social science is part of the project of 
restoring the administrative state, as well as improving immigration policy. 
 
 115 This form of review would apply to agency decisions such as the DHS enforcement guidance 
accompanying the Trump Administration’s interior enforcement executive order, the State 
Department’s vetting guidelines for implementation of the travel ban, DHS Secretary Janet 
Napolitano’s memo on DACA, and immigration court decisions from the DOJ and EOIR. 
 116 Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Corp., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 117 These principles echo sentiments from the move for evidence-based policymaking in other 
countries. See generally WHAT WORKS? EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC SERVICES 
(Huw T.O. Davies et al. eds., 2000); Gary Banks, Evidence-Based Policy Making: What is It? How Do 
We Get It?, ANU PUBLIC LECTURE SERIES, PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, CANBERRA (Feb. 4, 2009), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1616460 [https://perma.cc/6GSB-2TLE]; Michael Howlett, Policy Analytical 
Capacity and Evidence-Based Policy-making: Lessons from Canada, 52 CANADIAN PUBL. ADMIN. 153 
(2009); Wayne Parsons, From Muddling Through to Muddling Up – Evidence Based Policy Making 
and the Modernisation of British Government, 17 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 43 (2002). 
